SUMMARY
In an increasingly complicated international context, Taiwan’s next government – due to take office in May – is unlikely to bow to growing pressure from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It counts on the United States as an ally, although there is always the question of to what extent Washington would get involved in an eventual conflict with Beijing? Xi Jinping delivered two seemingly contradictory messages at the CPC Congress in 2022: he wants peaceful unification, but will not renounce the use of force if he deems it necessary.
Juan Leña
The presidential and legislative elections of 13 January in Taiwan produced results that, although they point to probable institutional instability in the absence of clear majorities, it is also true that precisely for this reason it is likely that neither the new president, Lai Ching-te, of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), nor the Legislative Chamber (Yuan), where the DPP is in the minority, will be able to take measures that will raise tensions with China too high. It is striking that the DPP, the party of Taiwanese identity and the party most distant from Beijing, has won elections three times in a row, despite threats and pressure from China. Perhaps because, without being in the majority, the sense of identity is taking root in Taiwanese society.
This being the case, the outcome could be described as balanced in view of the circumstances. It is undoubtedly better to move towards understanding and cooperation than to opt for the path of confrontation. Large majorities sometimes lead to hasty and risky decisions in complex scenarios, such as that of relations between China and Taiwan, which directly involve the US and other important countries in the region, such as Japan, and which could lead, if necessary, to the destabilisation of the global economy, given Taiwan’s enormous importance in the field of semiconductors. It appears that the status quo is preferred by the population in the face of the risks of military confrontation.
In sum, the 13 January elections had a high turnout (71.85%), only three points lower than the 2020 elections. As is well known, outgoing President Tsai Ing-wen, an emblematic figure of the DPP and pro-independence sentiment, was legally barred from running for a third term. Three main candidates vied for the voters’ favour: Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), who was Ms Tsai’s vice-president; Hou Yu-ih of the Kuomintang (KMT), the party closest to Beijing; and Ko Weng-je of the Taiwan People’s Party. President-elect Lai Ching-te received only 40% of the votes cast, far below the votes Ms Tsai received in her two previous terms (around 56%). In the legislative chamber (Yuan), the Kuomintang (KMT) won 52 seats, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 51, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) 8, and two seats went to two small independents. In view of these results, there will be much to discuss and negotiate in order to be able to govern.
In any case, until the new president takes office next May, it does not seem likely that China will adopt, in response, measures similar to those we saw in 2022, on the occasion of the visit of the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, to Taipei. Measures that raised tension on and around the island to the maximum, with threats, diplomatic measures of isolation, economic sanctions and military manoeuvres at sea and in the air. Rejection that, albeit with less intensity, China once again expressed when in 2023 Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, on a transit trip to the US, met with leading figures in the US administration. Since the 1950s, there have been several military clashes between China and Taiwan, mainly between 1954 and 1996, without the military confrontation turning into open war, due to the support given by the US to Taiwan and the limited naval and air power of Mao’s China.
Since the death of Chiang Kai-she in 1975 and the end of martial law in 1987, Taiwan has gradually evolved towards representative democracy with presidential and legislative elections, which have allowed for alternation of power. However, Taiwan’s democratic advances and extraordinary economic and technological achievements have not facilitated understanding with China, for which there is no China other than that represented by the People’s Republic, while Taiwan does not renounce its uniqueness either. For Taiwan it is no longer a question of speaking for the whole of China, as in the past, but of being seen as a separate entity. Long and difficult negotiations between the People’s Republic and Taiwan have taken place over the years, not officially, but through unofficial entities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
With the arrival of Lee Teng-hui to the Taiwanese presidency, political contacts between China and Taiwan became more dynamic, with very substantial advances in trade and investment in the 1980s and 1990s, until the so-called One China Consensus was reached in 1992 between the two sides, the basis of bilateral relations until 2016, when Tsai Ing-wen, of the Democratic Progressive Party and with markedly separatist ideas, came to power. She will win two terms in office, but relations with China will enter a period of difficulties, confrontation and stagnation of exchanges. Suffice it to recall that during Ms Tsai’s two terms in office Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation has increased markedly, with Honduras and Nauru recently breaking off relations with Taiwan. As a result, only eleven countries of little significance now recognise the Republic of China.
The so-called One-China Consensus is the umbrella under which China and Taiwan are covered. The problem is that Beijing and Taipei have different interpretations of the terms of the Consensus. For People’s China the Consensus excludes both the existence of two Chinas and one China and one Taiwan, while for Taiwan the Consensus is interpreted as “one country and two areas governed separately by two political entities”. In 1995 President Jiang Zemin addressed an eight-point message to Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui, reiterating that the “one China” principle is sine qua non for peaceful reunification. Lee Teng-hui’s counter-offer was contained in a six-point message, the first of which was to “achieve the unification of China on the basis of the realisation that the nation is run by two separate governments”. It is difficult to square the circle of getting Beijing and Taipei to agree.
For its part, the US has, since the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in 1979, endorsed the “One China” policy, which for Beijing is one of the most sensitive points in relations with Washington. According to the Biden administration, the Sino-US relationship in terms of the “one China policy” is governed by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiqués with the People’s Republic of China of 1972, 1978 and 1982, and the Six Assurances communicated by President Reagan to the Taiwanese government in 1982. Regarding the US attitude in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan, the US practices a policy of “strategic ambiguity”, which is still in place today, although President Biden has stated four times since 2021 that the US would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. The ‘strategic ambiguity’ makes sense because automatic support for Taiwan could lead the US and the People’s Republic of China into a conflict with very serious consequences.
President Xi Jinping said at the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress in October 2022 that unification with Taiwan is necessary for “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and that China is for peaceful unification under the “one country, two systems” formula, which Deng Xiaoping proposed as early as 1982 and which is now being applied in Hong Kong with the rejection of some segments of the population. However, Xi added categorically at the CCP Congress that China will never renounce the use of force to achieve unification, if necessary.
Taiwan and the South China Sea issue are two of the most strategically far-reaching problems in East and South Asia. In the space of just over four decades, China has become the world’s factory and is now the world’s second largest economy. Until recently focused on domestic development, China’s diplomacy is increasingly vocal, without hiding its aspirations to global leadership, reiterating that the Chinese military must be prepared to fight and win. If Deng Xiaoping referred to certain Chinese claims in the region without haste, leaving their resolution to future generations, Xi Jinping’s China is asserting itself more and more emphatically and imposing its own worldview and interests, as in the South China Sea, without regard for coastal countries or freedom of navigation.
JUAN LEÑA
Ambassador of Spain
Juan Leña Casas, born in Cabra (Córdoba) in 1940, holds a degree in Law and has been a member of the Diplomatic Corps since 1974, from which he retired in 2010, with the professional category of ambassador.
He is a great connoisseur of the Asian world, having been Spanish Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China (1993-1999), to Japan (1999-2003) and to South Korea (2008-2010).
He has also been Ambassador to Algeria (2004-2008), as well as Director General of the Bureau of Diplomatic Information (1988-1993) and Deputy Director General for North America and the Philippines, Asia and the Pacific.
