Diego López Garrido
Director of Fundación Alternativas
24 February 2022 did not only change the history of Ukraine. The Russian invasion, decreed by Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian regime, had objectives that went beyond the control of one nation by another. It also sought to resuscitate Russia as a great power rival to the Western world and a leader in the geopolitical space between China and the United States. And it sought – and seeks – to fundamentally weaken the European project embodied in the Brussels institutions, in particular their capacity to influence countries that once belonged to the Soviet Union or were under its decisive domination.
The war against Ukraine was initially intended to subdue that country in its entirety. Russia did not succeed. But, as we can see, it seems to have succeeded in stabilising its military forces in the Dombass area, and in maintaining the presence of a Russian government in Crimea. We cannot know what will happen after two years of war. Nor the terms of a hypothetical armistice, which Ukraine will sign in a position that will depend on the balance of power in the theatre of war.
Whatever the outcome of the battlefield confrontation, the international order will no longer be the same as it was after the Soviet implosion. For obvious reasons such as the entry of Finland and Sweden into NATO; Russia’s de facto political break with the European Union and its member countries, especially those bordering Russia (Poland, the Baltics); and the resurgence of a 21st century Cold War with obvious serious economic consequences.
Also for reasons that we could call latent, following Merton’s terminology. I am referring to the sudden disappearance of the implicit “trust” that existed implicitly between powers with nuclear arsenals, which was established between East and West. A trust that was especially necessary for the veto-wielding countries in the UN Security Council: the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom and France. A confidence that nuclear weapons would not be used, which should only have a deterrent function, but never a threatening one.
Russia’s invasive action in Ukraine, which is in direct contravention of international law, has shattered the basic structures of the international community that originated in the last century after World War II. Hence Putin’s irresponsible decision has triggered a defensive reaction within Europe, paradoxically reviving an Atlantic Alliance that Putin wished to dwarf or avoid strengthening.
What has happened is that NATO countries and the European Union (EU) are helping by sending arms to Ukraine. Most recently, the EU has approved 50 billion euros in aid. In the US, President Biden has proposed $60 billion in arms and ammunition aid for Ukraine as part of a $95 billion security bill. It has passed the Senate, but the Republican majority in the House of Representatives will not allow such aid to Ukraine to pass. Behind this position is undoubtedly Donald Trump.
Regardless of his ideological position, Trump does not want Ukraine to advance in the war because that success would be Joe Biden’s for the presidential elections in November this year. The real possibility of Trump winning the presidential election terrifies European countries, because his statements move in the direction of US isolationism towards Europe. The victim would be NATO, which Trump has despised on numerous occasions. And the victor Putin, for obvious reasons.
The most relevant disruptive effect of all of the above is that the European Union and its member states have resolutely opted for a significant increase in defence spending. This will not be enough. It will require a development of what has been called “strategic autonomy”. A revolution in the geo-strategy of the international order.
The defence of Ukraine is key to the Union’s security policy. For the war in Ukraine, the most enduring since World War II, is more than a war. The future of Europe is at stake; as is the democratic and pro-western future of Ukraine, in a “rougher” world, in Ursula von der Leyen’s terms.
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