Enrique Viguera
Ambassador of Spain
In political terms, according to the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, accession requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Monitoring the quality of democracy in the candidate countries during the accession process is therefore a simple and very efficient procedure.
EU enlargement thus becomes not only a formidable instrument for promoting economic development in the candidate countries, but also for promoting stability, democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms in the candidate countries.
Although these political conditions are very clear, at the time of enlargement to the Eastern countries, the law derived from the ‘Third Pillar’ then and the so-called Area of Freedom, Security and Justice now, was embryonic and not as developed as it is now. In recent years the regulation of this sector has come a long way, as have the mechanisms for monitoring and supervising freedoms and the rule of law in EU member states. But the existing EU mechanisms do not yet seem to be sufficient guarantee to prevent an ‘illiberal’ or authoritarian drift in any member state, which helps to explain, in part, what has happened in Poland, a situation happily overcome after the last elections, and in Hungary, where the EU has so far been unable to reverse the situation, as neither the instruments of the Treaty (art. 7 for example) nor the threat to freeze financial aid have worked. On the other hand, it remains to be seen how to react to a possible ‘illiberal’ drift in Slovakia, about whose development the European Parliament has already expressed concern.
If hypothetically these accessions had been delayed by only a few years, perhaps some of the candidates would not have been able to join the EU. This is the case with Turkey. I recall that the risk of being able to freeze Slovakia’s EU accession process during the Spanish presidency in 2002 was a major reason why the populist Meciar (whose death, by the way, was reported only a few days ago) did not win the elections that year.
The remarkable legislative development experienced by the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (the acquis of which is embodied in chapters 23 – Judiciary and fundamental rights – and 24 – Justice, Freedom and Security – of the enlargement negotiations) is one of the reasons why further accessions will be so difficult. The assessment of the quality of democracy is no longer as general as before, because the level of concreteness of the new acquis is detailed and allows for reasoned arguments based on EU law. So basic political issues such as respect for freedoms, freedom of the press and opinion, the fight against corruption or the guarantee of the separation of powers are now absolute impediments for all candidate countries.
This situation affects all candidates equally, to a greater or lesser degree. Traditionally, it was believed that the smaller a country was, the easier its accession process would be. But here is the case of Montenegro, the candidate country that seems best prepared, which, with only 620,000 inhabitants, and applying for membership in 2008 after more than 10 years of accession negotiations, has only provisionally managed to close ….. 3 chapters. It seems like a joke, compared to the ‘very long’ negotiation process (6 years) that Spain (with 75 times more population than Montenegro) endured.) And what remains……. The 2022 ‘Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index’ called the country’s regime a ‘flawed democracy’ and ranked it 61st out of 167 countries considered.
Consequently, the accession of the Balkan countries (whose per capita income is around 35% and in none of them half of the EU average) will not be easy because structural reforms will take a long time. Even on the economic front, despite the massive financial aid received, the reforms have not borne the expected fruit. Now the Commission has just proposed (November 2023), alongside all the financial development programmes already underway (Stabilisation and Association Process, Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, Western Balkans Investment Framework through the IPA, Pre-Accession Facility etc. etc.), a new Western Balkans Growth Plan that is capable of doubling the wealth of the area in 10 years. To start with 6 billion from 2024 to 2027. The course of time will show whether this is possible. Moreover, in addition to economic and political problems, the Western Balkans also face a host of unresolved regional problems that affect several of them and whose prior solution would seem necessary to ensure enlargement.
In view of the above, it would be irresponsible, in my view, to try to put tentative dates on enlargement as some still claim.
The phenomenal strength of the conditionality of EU membership is that it puts the candidate state under enormous pressure to carry out major structural reforms in all respects. It is an extraordinary lever that forces the candidate states to gradually but radically change their traditional way of functioning until they become as democratic as the other member states, with modern administrations capable of complying with the increasingly demanding acquis communautaire.
And this is why it makes sense to have decided to open negotiations at the end of the last Spanish presidency with Moldova and Ukraine and to grant candidate status to Georgia. Apart from possible problems with Russia – that is another matter – experience shows that the mere hope of EU membership is a fabulous incentive to make progress towards real political, economic and social transformation of the candidates.
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