Miguel Angel Medina
International Relations Analyst
The debate on artificial intelligence cannot, and should not, be separated from other debates on global governance, such as security, sovereignty and the correct use of technology. Let us recall the debate that the pandemic brought up about the EU’s strategic autonomy (the high representative famously said that ‘Europe has more than a thousand laboratories but does not produce a single gram of paracetamol, a medicine that depends on imports from India and China. And we hope that these two powers will continue to supply it’). And let us remember that the EU’s strategic weakness as a global actor remains a reality.
In October 2023, the EU published a list of the ten critical technologies that should protect the sovereignty of the EU-27 and provide them with the tools to strengthen economic security now and in the future (1). These ten strategic sectors are closely linked to the use of or access to critical infrastructures and resources, and are intended to respond to the tectonic shifts represented by increased geopolitical tensions, greater economic integration and accelerating technological development. This Decalogue highlights the enormous challenge posed by the technological revolution and can be seen as a call to Member States to analyse the risks, and opportunities, that these sectors represent for the citizens of the Union (2).
Along with semiconductors, quantum technologies and biotechnologies, Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies are extremely likely to present the most sensitive and immediate risks to the EU and its citizens, and to this end Brussels has adopted measures aimed at efficiently managing AI’s enormous transformative potential. The recent adoption of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act is significant in this regard, but let us not let the trees obscure the forest: Europe’s strategic defencelessness vis-à-vis other global players, a defencelessness that in the case of AI is worrying. Let’s sketch two brushstrokes in this regard.
First, AI is changing the rules of the game on the global geopolitical chessboard. The hierarchy that exists at the military or economic level does not exist in the field of AI; in the field of AI there are no clear winners and losers in each of the different aspects related to AI. Here we can highlight the location of production globally, the possession of or access to natural resources and critical raw materials, the use of technology, infrastructure, access to data, skilled labour and advanced knowledge. In this puzzle, China, the EU, the US, India, different African countries are all part of the game because they dominate some of these elements. In fact, algorithms and innovation are stamped by US companies, while 90% of the world’s critical resources come from China, the great dominator of rare earths, for example. However, the EU is a world leader in data, and let us remember that some of the edges of AI (high-performance computing, cloud and edge computing, and data analytics) have a wide range of dual-use applications and are crucial for strategic decision making or prediction. The EU can find a niche opportunity if it can leverage its competitive advantage here, because of the huge transformative potential of this critical technology.
Secondly, one recommendation would be for Europe to commit to having more capacity and bigger companies in charge of AI, which could fill the strategic deficit of the EU-27, could be a counterweight to US corporate giants, and could serve to project EU values, European-style governance, around the world. It is not only about strengthening the resilience of supply chains, including energy security, or security and technology leakage, but also about seizing the niche opportunity that AI offers. AI can be a window of opportunity for European countries to deepen their integration, maximise their diplomatic influence and diversify their economies in the coming years by focusing on technology diplomacy. Europe does not have silicon, coltan or microprocessors, but it does have a great deal of experience in managing projects in a coordinated way and overcoming its shortcomings.
(1) COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION (EU) 2023/2113 of 3 October 2023 on technology areas critical to EU economic security with a view to conducting additional risk assessments jointly with Member States
(2) These ten areas are: (advanced semiconductor technologies, artificial intelligence technologies, quantum technologies, biotechnologies, advanced connectivity, navigation and digital technologies, advanced sensing technologies, space and propulsion technologies, energy technologies, robotics and autonomous systems, and advanced materials, manufacturing and recycling technologies)
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