Enrique Viguera
Spanish Ambassador
The G20 emerged at the end of the last century as a platform for informal intergovernmental cooperation to try to control and prevent the spread of the Asian financial crisis. Although it was created as a ministerial forum, it was decided to convene a summit on the occasion of the 2007/8 financial crisis. Its successful response to that crisis consolidated the new summit format and secured the future of the organisation.
The G20 is an informal intergovernmental conference, whose decisions are taken by consensus, comprising a regular pattern of numerous expert meetings, according to a multilateral negotiating dynamic from the bottom (experts, working groups and sherpas) upwards (Ministers and Summit). The final Summit Declaration reflects the work of all, but is the responsibility of the rotating presidency, most recently held on 9-10 September in New Delhi in face-to-face format, and in virtual format on 22 November, both under the Indian presidency. Its conclusions are not binding, but the degree of compliance with the commitments made at the summits seems to be quite high. Although it remains an essentially economic and financial forum, the G20 has eventually broadened its agenda to include many other issues that affect the entire planet, including addressing major international conflicts.
The G20 emerged at the end of the unipolar world, when the US preferred to deal with the solution of international economic and financial problems, in an increasingly globalised world, with the most important economies being not only its allies, the EU, Japan etc., but also the emerging economies, such as China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Russia etc. One of the distinguishing factors of the G20 is its composition: no other international forum has been able to mobilise such a representative regional grouping of developed and emerging countries. Its members account for 85% of the world’s GDP.
Over the years, the relative economic power of the US has declined – it now accounts for just under 25% of world GDP, a far cry from 50% in the 1940s – while the power of the emerging countries continues to grow: China is now the world’s second largest economy (close to 20%) and India has overtaken the UK as the world’s fifth largest economy in terms of GDP.In economic terms, we already live in a multipolar world and the composition of the G20 reflects this.
The invitation to the African Union as a permanent member at the last G20 summit may have been a sign of a greater awareness of the problems of developing countries, particularly the most fragile ones, and this helps it to gain more legitimacy. The increase in World Bank funds, the reform of the Regional Banks or the new treatment of developing countries’ debt after COVID, issues on the agenda, are also signs of a greater awareness of the developing world’s problems.
The question is whether all the innovations, many inspired by emerging member countries – and more are sure to come in the coming years, driven by the upcoming G20 presidencies of Brazil and South Africa – will be enough to keep the Group cohesive.
China, whose president has not attended the last three summits, does not seem to be enthusiastic about the G20 and is prioritising its own global proposals, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, etc. The US, for its part, is no longer the champion of free trade (one of the pillars of the G20), and a possible victory for Trump, who is more protectionist and nationalist than Biden, would make it even more difficult to reconcile US interests with those of other countries, even allies, in multilateral forums, and the G20 is no exception.
On the other hand, BRICS, with an informal structure similar to the G20, is preparing for its first enlargement (Argentina, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Egypt and Ethiopia). Some competition with the G20 is on the horizon, trying to make up for its shortcomings and correcting the excessive Western weight. But like the G20, BRICS is also a rather heterogeneous group and its cohesion leaves something to be desired.
In its latest communiqué after the Johannesburg summit last summer, despite references to numerous international conflicts (Middle East, Haiti, Sudan, Sahel, Libya… even Western Sahara), it resolves the aggression of Ukraine by Russia in a rather laconic manner (…. “We recall our national positions concerning the conflict in and around Ukraine as expressed at the appropriate fora, including the UNSC and UNGA”). Although in the final New Delhi Declaration the G20 agreed on a much stronger formulation, the lack of mention of Russia also greatly diminished its impact. After the invasion of Ukraine, Russia feels more at home in BRICS than in the G20 where it has become a rather atypical country.
Despite all this, the G20 is perhaps one of the international bodies that best fits the global reality and one of those that has best adapted to the new globalised and multipolar international dynamic, as an ideal forum for tackling global challenges, including those affecting the least developed countries. But the growing polarisation between the great powers, the US and China, may hinder cooperation among G20 members and affect its effectiveness, making it difficult to reach agreements on global policies. A deepening of cooperation between Western industrial countries and emerging countries would be needed not only to regularly monitor the evolution of the world economy and help solve the problems of the developing world, but also to retain the interest of China and the US. The G20 is not only an ideal forum for managing global challenges, but also for defusing potential strategic rivalries.
© All rights reserved
