<h6><strong>Eduardo González</strong></h6> <h4><strong>In response to a series of written questions from the People’s Parliamentary Group in Congress, the Government has stated that the Ministry of Defense “has no contracts with the Chinese company Huawei for the supply of critical technology or devices” and that the Ministry of the Interior “has not signed any contract” with that company.</strong></h4> Huawei, one of the world's leading telecommunications companies, is classified by several Western countries as a “high-risk” supplier with regard to critical infrastructure, due to its possible links with the Chinese government. This has led some European Union member states to restrict or exclude Huawei and its competitor ZTE from the deployment of 5G networks, considering that the presence of these companies could compromise national and European security. On September 17, the European Commission warned of the security risks stemming from the contract between Pedro Sánchez's government and Huawei for the supply of servers for the SITEL system's judicial wiretapping, cautioning that it could increase the risk of foreign interference in Spain's technological infrastructure. In this context, on November 17, the People's Party (PP) asked the government "whether it considers the awarding of the wiretapping system contract to Huawei compatible with lines of action 14 and 15 of the National Security Strategy, which mandate strengthening intelligence capabilities against hostile actors and guaranteeing a secure framework for the protection of classified information." Likewise, in the remaining written parliamentary questions, the PP requests explanations “regarding the risk assessment carried out by the Government, in coordination with the National Intelligence Center and the Joint Cyber Command, concerning Huawei’s participation in the national system of judicial interceptions, in light of the national intelligence law and NATO warnings about high-risk suppliers,” and regarding “the receipt of any formal or informal communication from US authorities, NATO, or European partners warning of possible restrictions on intelligence sharing with Spain following the contract with Huawei.” The main opposition party is also asking about the measures taken “to ensure that technological collaboration with Huawei does not compromise the principle of mutual trust between NATO and EU allies,” about the justification for maintaining “contracts with a supplier classified by the European Commission as ‘high risk’,” about “the communications the Government has received from the European Commission regarding the contract with Huawei,” and about “the measures planned by the Ministry of the Interior to align with the European cybersecurity framework.” Furthermore, the People’s Party (PP) is asking the Executive whether it considered “alternative European or national suppliers with equivalent technical capabilities,” in line with the recommendation by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, “to strengthen European industrial and technological autonomy in defense,” and about “the measures planned to mitigate any potential technological or support dependence on Huawei for critical internal security or defense systems.” Finally, the People’s Group asks the "reason why the Joint Commission on National Security was not informed beforehand of the intention to award Huawei the judicial wiretapping contract." In its responses to these questions, issued on December 9 and published this Monday, December 22, by the Official Gazette of the Spanish Parliament (BOCG), the Government asserts that “the Ministry of Defense has no contracts with the Chinese company Huawei for the supply of critical technology or devices” and that, “within the scope of the Ministry of the Interior's responsibilities, it is reported that said Ministry has not signed any contract with the Chinese company Huawei.” Furthermore, it asserts that, “regarding the security of 5G networks and services, Spain fully implements the recommendations of the Council of the European Union and the 5G ‘toolbox’ adopted in 2020, within the framework of its powers and in accordance with legally established procedures, through Royal Decree-Law 7/2022, of March 29, on requirements to guarantee the security of fifth-generation electronic communications networks and services, and the National Security Framework for 5G networks and services, approved by Royal Decree 443/2024, of April 30.” “In compliance with these regulations, Spain implements the procedures, risk assessments, and mitigation measures provided for,” it adds. Regarding the question of why “the Joint Committee on National Security was not informed beforehand of the intention to award Huawei the contract for judicial wiretapping,” the Government responds that “the management and awarding of contracts is the responsibility of the Ministries and agencies that carry them out within the scope of their powers” and that “the activities that the Government reports to the Joint Committee, in accordance with Law 36/2015 on National Security,” are those relating to “the state of national security in Spain” and to “the National Security Strategy and its revisions when they occur.” At the beginning of September, the People’s Parliamentary Group submitted another set of questions on this same matter. Specifically, the PP asked the Government about the reasons why it has signed contracts with “Chinese state-owned companies” accused of “perpetrating cyberattacks against governments and critical infrastructure for espionage purposes” and warned that the agreements with Huawei could “call into question mutual technological trust” between Spain and the US and, with it, “the continuation of the American deployment” at the Rota Naval Base.
