<h6><strong>Eduardo González</strong></h6> <h4><strong>This coming fall marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Green March, a spectacular mass gathering organized by the King of Morocco, Hassan II, to seize control of the then Spanish Sahara.</strong></h4> The Green March was, above all, a particularly skillful maneuver by a monarch, Hassan II, who knew how to play with the times and take advantage of the political stagnation in Spain due to the agony of a dictator, Francisco Franco, whose military and political career had begun, precisely, in North Africa. In 1974, Spain solemnly announced its intention to hold a referendum on self-determination in the Sahara to end a dispute that had begun in 1955, with the country's entry into the UN and the more than forced acceptance of the international organization's principles on decolonization. UN pressure throughout the 1960s had forced Spain to accept a brief period of autonomy for its province and to set the date for holding a self-determination referendum in 1975. During that time, a portion of the Sahrawi people decided to take up arms and, in May 1973, formed the Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Río de Oro (Polisario Front), led by Mustafa Sayed. In this context, and knowing that he had very little chance of winning the referendum, Hassan II decided to appeal to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, the highest judicial body of the United Nations, to claim sovereignty over this 266,000-square-kilometer territory, rich in minerals and fisheries and held by Spain since the 19th century. The ICJ ruling was issued on October 16 with conclusive arguments: at the time of colonization by Spain, the Sahara was by no means an "ownerless territory," and although certain ties of subordination and land rights existed between some Sahrawi tribes and the Sultan of Morocco, there were no ties of sovereignty between Western Sahara and Morocco, so, in conclusion, the referendum should be held. Hassan II, as so often before, focused on the "certain ties of subordination" to claim that, according to the ICJ, Western Sahara had been Moroccan "since the dawn of time." That same October 16, the Alawite monarch announced, in a radio and television address, his intention to organize a peaceful march made up of 350,000 Moroccan men and women to "recover" the territory. "I will be the first to sign up for the volunteer list," he assured. The "pilgrims" would only carry one weapon, the Koran, he added, not failing to clarify that, should they encounter "foreign elements, other than Spanish," the Moroccans would exercise their right to defend themselves "without halting their march," a warning that implied they were carrying weapons other than the Islamic holy book. <h5><strong>The Green March</strong></h5> Around the same time, Spain's position gradually changed, and with it the name and rank of the Spanish dictatorship's interlocutors with the Moroccan monarchy. With Foreign Minister Pedro Cortina Mauri sidelined, and with it his intransigent stance in favor of the referendum, Franco's representation before Hassan II fell to the then-Prince Juan Carlos and the Minister of the National Movement, José Solís. Prince Juan Carlos visited El Aaiún on November 2 to reassure the Spanish military and the Sahrawis. On November 4, 1975, the 8th Flag of the Spanish Legion, stationed in the then province of Spanish Sahara, received orders to deploy to the border and attempt to stop "the enemy invasion." The so-called Operation Against Marabunta had been launched, for which the legionaries set up minefields and artillery barrages with the mission of opening fire in case of threat. The following day, Hassan II announced the start of Al Masira, the Green March, and on November 6, 350,000 civilians and 25,000 Moroccan soldiers gathered in the Tarfaya region, in the far south of Morocco, and peacefully penetrated up to 12 kilometers into Sahrawi territory, waving red and green flags and led by the then prime minister and brother-in-law of the king, Ahmed Osman. Morocco not only completely ignored the UN Security Council's request to end "the invasion," but, on November 6, it also hinted that, if necessary, the Royal Armed Forces could take military action, "potentially leading to a situation of belligerence between Spain and Morocco." The Spanish Army, with its full deployment, not only offered no resistance, but the following day, the government of Francisco Franco (whose life span was two weeks away) announced its decision to negotiate the transfer of the administration of the territory to Morocco. On November 8, the Minister of the Presidency met with Hassan II, and on November 9, the Alawite king ordered the withdrawal of the Green March. On November 10, the Green March began its return, and four days later, on November 14, 1975, Spain signed the Madrid Tripartite Agreements, handing over territorial control (but not sovereignty) to Morocco and Mauritania. Hassan II's gambit had borne fruit. <h5><strong>The Madrid Agreements, the end of the colony, and the birth of the SADR</strong></h5> In compliance with the Madrid Agreements, on the night of February 26, 1976, Spain ended its colonial presence in the Sahara. Although those negotiations had introduced Mauritania as a third party, they actually paved the way for Morocco to definitively take over the entire territory in August 1979. On February 27, 1976, the Polisario Front proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), recognized in November 1984 by the majority of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) countries. From then on, the exodus of large numbers of Sahrawi refugees began, settling in camps in the Algerian desert region of Tindouf. <h5><strong>50 Years Later: Pedro Sánchez's U-turn</strong></h5> Half a century after these events, the situation in Western Sahara remains stagnant. Morocco's sovereignty has still not been recognized by the international community, but its right to self-determination has been perpetually unfulfilled despite UN resolutions. As if that were not enough, in March 2022, the Spanish government made the unprecedented and unexpected decision to endorse the Moroccan autonomy plan for Western Sahara, considering it "the most serious, credible, and realistic basis for resolving this dispute," as Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez wrote in a letter to Mohammed VI. That "historic turning point," which radically changed Spain's position regarding its former colony and was rejected by the rest of the parliamentary spectrum, including its governing partners, allowed the country to overcome a very serious diplomatic crisis with Morocco and led to a meeting in Rabat on April 7 between the Prime Minister and the Moroccan King, where the roadmap that would mark the next phase of bilateral relations was adopted.
