Roberto Veiga González
Lawyer and political scientist / Collaborator with Fundación Alternativas
Donald Trump is employing the instrument of the ‘trade war’ in his geopolitical strategy and this could change the future that is now possible for Cuba. This White House policy aims to impose itself on other countries by affecting their welfare, although, on the contrary, it currently only seems possible to achieve such influence by offering opportunities. Thus, many countries will seek to use other resources of geopolitics in order to achieve stability and strengthen their domestic interests. This, in some cases, could benefit China.
In Latin America, Trump’s strategy aims to bring China’s own interests and those of the US into collision in important countries, with the aim of displacing the Asian giant. China has shown a growing interest in this region as part of its global strategy of economic and political expansion, as it is rich in natural resources and represents an important market for Chinese products. Even during the first Trump administration, relations between the US and Latin America were strained by protectionist policies and trade disputes, which widened China’s opportunities to strengthen its presence in the region. However, in the face of the US administration’s current strategy, China would also need to build a competing trade enclave in an area of the American hemisphere where US economic interests are not established.
Cuba, which also has a privileged geographical position for the development of regional shipping and trade, would be the only country with a ‘political location’ that could provide China with an area of the hemisphere in which to build such a competing trade enclave. Surely Cuban power strategists already see this potential advantage.
In this case, Havana might be willing to offer certain conditions that would make this collaboration attractive to China, such as developing the legal and economic framework for foreign investment, tax and customs incentives, channelling the development of logistics and port infrastructure, and offering China preferential access to its ports, such as Mariel, which already has a Special Development Zone (ZED), which could become a key logistics hub for the distribution of Chinese products to Latin America.
With this, Cuba could obviously obtain several significant benefits, such as Chinese investment in infrastructure, roads, railways, ports, special economic zones, logistics, telecommunications, technology, solar and wind energy, and light manufacturing, as well as the generation of jobs in these sectors. Also the export of Cuban products, for example tobacco and pharmaceuticals, to Latin American markets, as well as integration into global supply chains, and a strengthening of Cuba’s position in the region and on the international stage, capable of opening up new economic opportunities and consolidating its role as a key player in international relations.
This would have significant implications for US-Cuba relations, especially regarding possible negotiations with the Trump administration. If China strengthens its presence in Cuba, this could be perceived as a threat to US interests in the Western hemisphere. China’s use of Cuba as a commercial bridge could increase the perception of Cuba as a strategic actor in the region, and instead of being seen solely as a political adversary, it could be considered a key point in the global competition between the US and China. China’s investments in Cuba would reduce the impact of US sanctions, which would weaken Trump’s negotiating position.
Also, in conjunction with this China-Cuba alliance, Havana would be in a better position to make progress on two other strategic issues. I am referring to effective military cooperation with China and Russia capable of raising the current quality of its armed forces, and the development of capabilities to provide greater cooperation in the fight against organised crime in the hemisphere.
In the face of all this, Trump’s strategy would have to choose between reducing sanctions and allowing US companies to invest in the island to counterbalance China’s influence; or a policy of ‘maximum pressure’ that would include greater economic sanctions and trade restrictions. However, in this eventual new context, ‘maximum pressure’ towards the island would strengthen China.
I would also point out that if all of the above were to happen, Havana would probably not assume it as a mere tactic to seek better relations with the United States, nor would it perceive a possible negotiation with the White House as a dichotomous challenge between China and its northern neighbour. This strategy would surely be established as a guarantee of Cuba’s internal development and stability, and of its importance to the US and the world.
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