The recent incursion of Russian drones into Polish and Romanian airspace has revived a debate thought to be closed since 2022: the possibility of establishing a no-fly zone over Ukraine. Alarmed by the penetration of 19 unmanned aerial vehicles—some shot down by Polish and allied forces—Warsaw has urged NATO and the European Union to consider the measure as a way to reinforce regional security.
Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski declared that the technical capabilities to implement such a zone are available but stressed that the decision cannot be unilateral. His remarks reflect growing concerns that Russian aerial attacks on Ukraine could spill over into neighboring countries, challenging the boundaries of collective defense.
The proposal, however, raises the same dilemmas as in the early days of the invasion: a no-fly zone would require NATO aircraft to intercept or shoot down Russian drones or planes, with the consequent risk of direct military escalation. That was precisely why the Alliance rejected Kyiv’s request three years ago.
Now, with Poland having activated Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the issue has returned to the forefront. Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s government has pledged to accelerate military modernization, while public opinion remains divided between the need to defend sovereignty and the fear of a direct clash with Moscow.
Diplomatically, Poland’s request is more than a defensive gesture: it compels allies to consider whether protecting Ukraine must also mean shielding the entire eastern flank of the Union. What is at stake is not only the effectiveness of air defense but the credibility of Europe’s security architecture as a whole.
