<h6><a href="https://aquieuropa.com/charles-powell-espana-tiende-a-europeizar-si-surge-una-amenaza-o-un-problema-pero-no-siempre-es-posible-ni-conveniente/"><strong>Redacción Aquí Europa</strong></a></h6> <h4><strong>In an increasingly fragmented global context, the rebirth of a multipolar world seems inevitable. Charles Powell, director of the Elcano Royal Institute, reflects on the deep roots of this transformation and how internal tensions in the United States have accelerated this process. This analysis also addresses Europe's role in the face of a paradigm shift in international relations, highlighting the opportunities and challenges facing the European Union, and specifically Spain, in an increasingly complex global landscape. Powell offers a critical view of Spain's strategic alliances, the relevance of its relationship with Latin America, and the need to recover a proactive approach within the European Union.</strong></h4> <strong>Aquí Europa – Do you think we are truly witnessing a change in the international order? Has the President of the United States brought us to this point, or has this been brewing for some time? How do you see the global situation?</strong> <strong>Charles Powell</strong> – We see it as something that has been underway for quite some time. The root causes have to do with the phenomenon of globalization, its fragmentation, and the impact all this has had on the United States. What we've seen there is a country that, while remaining a major economic and military power, is beginning to perceive itself as a loser in the face of globalization. And, consequently, it's turning its back on the system that it, to a large extent, had created after World War II. This is very paradoxical, because it's unusual for a superpower to begin to feel it's in decline. We saw it after World War II in the United Kingdom, but it was a different phenomenon. I think what we're witnessing now is precisely that: the consolidation of a multipolar world. Not only with two major poles, like China and the United States, but also with others like India, among others, and without strong multilateral institutions. To put it simply, that's the dilemma we face. <strong>Aquí Europa – And in all this context, what role can Europe really play? We're pursuing a competitiveness agenda, trying to correct past mistakes in this legislative term... But, from your perspective, where do you place the European Union on this global stage?</strong> <strong>Charles Powell </strong>– On the one hand, this is not a favorable environment for us. We are a union of 27 states, but we are not yet a political union; we haven't even completed economic and monetary union. Above all, we are a large internal market, which functions reasonably well, although it is currently under pressure and at risk of fragmentation. We have very accurate diagnoses, such as the Draghi reports or those of Enrico Letta's high-level group. The big question is whether we will have the political will necessary to carry out the reforms we all know are needed. In that sense, Trump may end up being, paradoxically, good news for us. He can act as an "external federator" of the European Union. We have already clearly seen that we cannot continue as we have been, especially in the areas of defense and security. But this has other implications, such as the technological dimension. As a Europeanist, I believe that strategic autonomy is our most valuable asset, and it's the one we must play. Of course, it will cost us a lot of work, especially in defense and security, because we have very different perceptions of what constitutes a threat. I always remember our motto: "United in diversity." But, in reality, there is far more diversity than unity within this peculiar invention we have all built. Despite this, I consider myself optimistic. Because in the world, most countries still desire a rules-based international order. The chaos Trump generates is not good for anyone. And Europe has a great strength: our ability to create institutions and procedures. We have done this internally, and we can do it externally. So, if you were to ask me what the great objective of the European Union should be in the medium or long term, I would say it is the refoundation of the rules-based liberal international order. But it must be a more inclusive order. And one that takes more into account the interests of what has been called the "global south." At Elcano, we prefer the term "plural south," which we believe is more accurate. That is: India, China, but also Africa, much of Asia... Understanding their interests, being sensitive to their needs, without throwing ourselves into China's arms. In fact, I just spent two or three hours with experts on China. My advice would be: on the one hand, not to break the transatlantic relationship ourselves; to try to salvage as much of it as we can. I think NATO will survive, although probably not in the same form or the same role it has now. And, of course, not to throw ourselves into the arms of China, because it's not a reliable partner either. Will we be able to do all this? It's going to be difficult. But I think, finally, we've reached the moment of truth. <strong><img class="alignnone wp-image-116026 size-full" src="https://thediplomatinspain.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Powell-4.jpg" alt="" width="750" height="418" />Aquí Europa – Naturally, let's now turn to our home: Spain. From here, we observe the world and the European Union, but what role does Spain really play within the Union? What should that role be in a Europe that has changed so much? I remember that time, as Ambassador Elorza used to say, when there was a "Franco-German directory" and the rest of us simply tried to adapt. But today, that no longer seems to be the case. How do you think Spain should position itself?</strong> <strong>Charles Powell</strong> – Indeed, regarding Elorza's comment, everyone today recognizes that the Franco-German tandem is still necessary, but it's no longer sufficient. It's an essential condition, yes, but it's not enough on its own. I often say, sometimes jokingly and to simplify things greatly, that Spain's policy toward the European Union over the last 30 or 40 years could be summed up like this: "everything with Germany, nothing against France." And if you look closely, the major milestones in our European trajectory have responded to that logic. Now, I think Spain should be more ambitious in Europe. We are the fourth-largest economy on the continent, after Germany, France, and Italy. We would have been fifth if the United Kingdom were still in the Union, but it is no longer there. And, in general, we are a country with weight and prestige within the European project. My main criticism is that we often adopt an overly conservative attitude, especially when it comes to building alliances. For example, President Sánchez once asked me: "What is the best thing I have done in foreign policy?" And I replied: the non-paper on strategic autonomy prepared jointly with the Netherlands. A somewhat peculiar answer, perhaps, but very revealing. And what is the logic behind that response? Well, after Brexit, the Dutch began to look around, wondering who they could collaborate with. Germany and France, of course, are key partners for everyone. But why not also consider an alliance between the fourth and fifth largest economies in the EU? If both agree on issues such as the defense of the internal market or the strategic economy, real progress can be made. And in fact, that has had some impact, perhaps not as much as we would have liked, but it is a good example of what I would like to see Spain do. Another example: Romania. It is an increasingly important country, and around one million Romanians live in Spain. Are we taking advantage of that adequately? These people have come voluntarily, they work, they save, they pay taxes, they are European citizens, and they can move freely… but we are not taking full political and strategic advantage of that relationship. And I would say the same about Poland, a rising European power. I think we must lose our fear of the idea that the Union's center of gravity could shift toward Central and Eastern Europe. We often fear being left on the periphery, but I believe that, in reality, we are all peripheral in some sense. Spain, of course, is no more peripheral than Poland or Romania. We should be more skillful at building alliances. And then there are other issues that could be improved. For example, one of the great mysteries of the European Union is the weak relationship between Spain and Italy. If you look closely, we almost never do anything important together, despite the fact that we are the third and fourth largest economies in the Union, and we share strategic interests: the southern flank, the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa… Again, what I notice is a certain lack of creativity. And it's something we've been carrying with us for decades, even since the Transition. The Italians supported our entry into the European Community, but beyond that, we've never developed a solid alliance with them. <strong>Aquí Europa – Before making the Atlantic leap and talking about Latin America—an obligatory reference when it comes to Spain, the European Union, and this paradigm shift—I would like to dwell on an element that might seem minor, but is very significant: the Iberian alliance with Portugal. What can really be put on the table? Why haven't we made progress, so to speak, toward an "Iberian Benelux"? Why haven't we achieved deeper Spanish-Portuguese cooperation, despite the excellent relationship?</strong> <strong>Charles Powell</strong> – The relationship is indeed very good. It's sometimes overlooked, for example, that Spain exports more to Portugal than to all of Latin America. In economic terms, we are practically a single market. Of course, it's also true that this creates some tensions, because there's a clear asymmetry in the size of the two countries: 10 million inhabitants versus 38 million. In part, this is due to certain historical misgivings, but it's also influenced by the fact that we haven't been able to identify shared projects that jointly position Spain and Portugal within the European context. For example, we remain an energy island, and that should have encouraged us toward greater cooperation. To be fair, I think this government has handled its relationship with Portugal quite well, but perhaps what's missing is finding instruments that give it greater visibility and reach. We also have to take into account a very interesting tension within the European project: that between the bilateral and the community level. One of my concerns is that Spain tends to "Europeanize" everything. If a threat or problem arises, the automatic response is to transfer it to the community level. But that's not always possible or convenient. For example, with Morocco, that doesn't quite work. We Europeanized the issue of fishing at the time—although it's no longer as relevant today—but there are other issues, such as Ceuta and Melilla, migration, and terrorism, that remain the exclusive responsibility of individual states. And they can't be Europeanized so easily. So the great challenge, once again, is finding the balance between bilateral and community issues. And we haven't always been able to do this well. <strong>Aquí Europa – Let's talk about Latin America. It's a constant debate; it's part of our DNA, our history, but it's also clear that the relationship has weakened. Ibero-American summits, like the upcoming one they're trying to promote, are severely diminished. Our capacity for influence is limited, especially when compared to the growing presence of actors like China. What can Spain really do in Latin America in this context, even more so when the United States seems to have resumed a kind of Monroe Doctrine, largely ignoring what's happening south of the Rio Grande?</strong> <strong>Charles Powell</strong> – Indeed, this is an issue I recently revisited while working on the book mentioned earlier. When one returns to the origins of the Ibero-American summits, such as those in Guadalajara in 1991 or Madrid in 1992, one remembers the excitement, the force with which they were born, and how they were perceived by Latin Americans themselves. That stage has passed, and we are clearly in a different phase. Part of the problem is that, as I mentioned earlier, we have Europeanized our relationship with Latin America. And the truth is that not all EU member states share our enthusiasm. This has generated frustration, as was clearly seen with the agreement with Mercosur, where Spanish support contrasts with the reluctance of other partners. At the Elcano Royal Institute, we published a report that has given us great satisfaction, entitled "Why Does Latin America Matter?" In it, we debunk some stereotypes: it is not an economic or political disaster, it has not been "colonized" by China, and it remains a space naturally linked to both Europe and the United States. Furthermore, we also refute the now widespread idea that Spain "put too many eggs in the Latin American basket." On the contrary, we demonstrate that it has been the best foreign investment Spanish companies have ever made. The big question is: what now? Well, the future will also depend on them. It's true that many Latin American governments are going through difficult times and view us with some distrust. In my opinion, the right formula lies in balancing bilateral and European relations. That is, Europeanizing what makes sense within the community framework—and continuing to try to make the French, German, and other countries see the importance of Latin America—but at the same time strengthening bilateral ties with each of those countries. I always say the same thing: you can develop an "Africa Plan," for example, and have it on the table, but how much money is actually invested in that plan? That effort isn't always quantified. Similarly, you can proclaim that Latin America is a priority, but the question is: how many people are actually working in the embassy in Buenos Aires? And in Santiago, Chile? Because if there aren't resources, then don't tell me about it. Rhetoric, when not backed up by actions, becomes tiresome, and that generates frustration on both sides. Unfortunately, that's the feeling we have now when we talk about the future of the Ibero-American summits. The great tragedy is that, today, enormous efforts are required to get presidents to attend and participate. And that reveals that we have an underlying structural problem. <h5><strong><img class="alignnone wp-image-116023 size-full" src="https://thediplomatinspain.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Powell-2.jpg" alt="" width="750" height="427" /></strong><strong>EU-UK Relations</strong></h5> <strong>Aquí Europa – I'd like to introduce into this conversation an element you know very well: the United Kingdom. We're not talking about a possible re-entry into the European Union, but in your opinion, what would be a realistic scenario for the relationship between the United Kingdom and continental Europe in the current context?</strong> <strong>Charles Powell</strong> – I have always been a staunch supporter of the United Kingdom's continued membership in the European Union. Brexit has been, in my opinion, a disaster on multiple levels: economic, political, and even sociological. Many people aren't fully aware of the impact it has had on the relationship between our societies. Even seemingly minor things, like a British orchestra coming to play in Europe or organizing an art exhibition or a theater tour, have become enormously complicated. That's a real tragedy. The only positive consequence I see in the new international context generated by Donald Trump's election is the rapprochement that is taking place between the United Kingdom and the European Union in the areas of security and defense. In this area, along with the French army, the British are the only ones with a true capacity for force projection: they have nuclear weapons, experience in military interventions, and an advanced level of training. The Polish army is growing significantly, and its army is becoming increasingly relevant, but it still lacks the experience of having been present in theaters of conflict like Afghanistan, for example. I think that in this area of defense and security, the United Kingdom will once again play a central role. Why? Because within the Union itself, we will probably move toward a structure of "concentric circles" or "coalitions of the willing," as has been so often said. And in some of these coalitions, especially in the fight against terrorism, defense, or security, the United Kingdom will be an essential partner. At least, I hope that this will be consolidated. Now, does this mean that the United Kingdom will one day return to the European Union? The question is often asked whether the British would be willing to return. But we should also ask ourselves whether we Europeans would be willing to accept its return. Personally, I would be. But if the UK remains a partner that consistently opposes further integration—as it has been for so long—then it is difficult to imagine it participating in the long-term European project. Let's not forget that in the UK there is clear resistance to the idea of an "ever closer union," which is precisely one of the founding principles of the Treaty of the Union. And if Europe is going to move—as seems logical—toward deeper integration in the economic, banking, fiscal, and even political spheres, the UK probably won't be able to join us on that path. Therefore, in the short and medium term, the most realistic scenario I see is more intense intergovernmental cooperation, especially in defense matters. The UK could act as a bridge with the United States, although it is also true that this "special relationship" between the two is no longer what it once was. Still, London can help us maintain better connections with Washington. And finally, I found it very comforting to see Labour leader Keir Starmer, who could be the next prime minister, speak about Europe and the relationship with Europe in a completely different tone than what we've heard in recent years. <strong>Aquí Europa – I would like to ask you about the two major international conflicts we are currently experiencing and about Spain's capacity for influence in both arenas. From the Elcano Institute, as a strategic think tank, what is your assessment of the conflict in Ukraine? And, personally, how do you see the possible evolution of this war?</strong> <strong>Charles Powell</strong> – Unfortunately, we believe there is no evidence that Putin wants to sit down at the table, and therefore, even despite the enormous pressure the Trump administration has exerted on Zelensky and the Ukrainian regime, we believe it's not going anywhere. It's not a total surprise. People have forgotten the expectations generated by dialogue with North Korea. Kim, the most atrocious dictator in the world, was given a lot with those bilateral meetings on equal terms. And that has led to absolutely nothing; in fact, the regime has worsened, continuing to invest in nuclear weapons. So what is Trump trying to do? It has been suggested that he is reversing Kissinger's strategy: if Kissinger sought to get closer to China to isolate the USSR, Trump would now be trying to get closer to Russia to isolate China. But we don't see that as really the case, not because there is a solid alliance between Moscow and Beijing, but because, despite their differences, they share enough tactical and strategic interests to maintain a certain degree of coordination. Regarding Ukraine, we sincerely don't believe peace is imminent. Putin is seeking to buy time, rearm, and gain strategic breathing space. We don't know how long this conflict will last, but what is clear, at least in Europe, is that we are facing an existential threat. If we allow Putin to get his way, the Baltic countries, Poland, or any other member state could be next. That's why we must stand firm, even if the cost is high. In that sense, I think the Spanish Prime Minister's decision, announced this morning, to achieve the target of 2% of GDP in defense spending, which represents more than €10 billion in additional spending, is a good one. It is, without a doubt, the right path. <h5><strong><img class="alignnone wp-image-116027 size-full" src="https://thediplomatinspain.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Powell-3.jpg" alt="" width="750" height="422" /></strong><strong>Gaza and the Middle East Conflict</strong></h5> <strong>Charles Powell </strong>– I have been leading a Spanish-Israeli forum for years, although we had to temporarily suspend it because they didn't even want to talk to us. The perception in Israel is that Spain has become, to some extent, a hostile country. They have been deeply hurt by the Spanish government's recognition of the State of Palestine. Israelis are still in a state of shock. The October 7 attack was a national tragedy that we, from the outside, don't always fully understand. However, this trauma cannot justify a response that has already caused more than 40,000 deaths, many of them women and children, in Gaza. The great fear now is that Trump will give Israel carte blanche to act without restraint, as already seems to be happening in part. In this conflict, Europe has very little influence, let's be realistic. The influential Arab countries—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates—could play a mediating role, but they are not truly willing to get deeply involved or make real sacrifices. So, unfortunately, everything points to the drama continuing. And not just in Gaza. In the West Bank, we don't see any positive elements on the horizon either. <strong>Aquí Europa – And finally, in all this, Spain, with Spanish, as a great tool of communication in the world and as a way of understanding the world, because a language, as we well know, is not just a tool of communication, but a way of thinking. There we are. You direct the great Spanish think tank, the great center of thought and analysis. How can we have a greater influence in this world from that Spanish perspective that has always, historically, contributed so much to humanity? What can we do?</strong> <strong>Charles Powell</strong> – As you'll recall, our true founder was Emilio Lamo de Espinosa, who always had a very clear understanding of the importance of language, of culture, even as an economic value. And, in fact, with a person who died prematurely, Jaime Otero, we produced reports with the Marquis of Tamarón on the economic value of Spanish. Spain has an enormous amount of soft power that it often underutilizes. It often underutilizes it. The Spanish political situation is not conducive. We've always said it: foreign policy is a reflection of domestic politics. And we are in a phase of extreme polarization and political fragmentation in Spain. I don't think anyone questions this; it's a fact that can be seen every day. As long as there isn't greater cohesion and internal consensus regarding the major issues of foreign policy, we will continue to underutilize this enormous amount of soft power, which has to do with language, but also with the fact that this year we will be the second most visited country in the world. That people voluntarily spend their money, their savings, to take a plane... It's spectacular. People don't realize it. There are 193 countries in the United Nations. Castile and the world are wide, the land is wide. And yet, in spite of that, we are second. Maybe first. If we look at the artistic, architectural, musical, gastronomic, and other heritages... So, well, it's true that these campaigns were carried out at the time. I'm not a big fan of institutionalizing these things either... the whole issue of the Spain brand back in the day. We collaborate as much as possible. In fact, Spain has a fantastic image abroad. We just conducted a survey on Spain's image in the Benelux region, even. And, well, there too, in the Benelux region—which is perhaps not an easy place—even there, Spain enjoys an exceptional image. Perhaps the question is how to try to develop policies that last over time, how to institutionalize certain actions. This has been done in the field of tourism. I always remind people that—this is unknown—in 50 or 60 years, Spain has only had about three advertising slogans. First, it was <em>Spain is different</em>, then <em>Everything under the sun</em> and <em>A passion for life</em>. Well, that says a lot about a country, having three. There's no need to say more. Exactly, that captures it perfectly. Even with different political regimes and governments. That's what we have to strive for. And, of course, the Instituto Cervantes should be given greater resources. There should be a much more expansive policy. Of course, there are budgetary issues, but I think priorities are sometimes poorly chosen. And, perhaps, with public-private partnerships, with the media, with the publishing world—we have an extraordinarily powerful publishing world—in short, we should be more strategic and less tactical.
