<h6><strong>Eduardo González</strong></h6> <h4><strong>Ernesto Talvi, senior researcher at the Elcano Royal Institute and former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, said on Thursday that Spain could play an important role as a “political bridge” between the EU and Latin America in order to, based on the EU-Mercosur agreement and harmonizing the rest of the existing trade agreements between both parties, create a large commercial association capable of competing with the two great economic powers of the world, the US and China.</strong></h4> “Spain can be a privileged protagonist as a Euro-Atlantic partner and as a political bridge due to its privileged position” between the two regions, declared Talvi during the presentation of <a href="https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/policy-paper/espana-en-el-mundo-en-2025-perspectivas-y-desafios/">‘Spain in the world in 2025: perspectives and challenges’</a>, the thirteenth edition of the annual report of the Think Tank that analyses the prospects of the international panorama and the challenges for Spanish foreign action in the new year. According to Talvi - who was a presidential candidate with the Colorado Party and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay between March and July 2020 - Latin America offers, analysed from a regional perspective, a GDP of six billion euros, “more than Germany, Japan and India, which are the third, fourth and fifth economies in the world”. “Latin America is great as a region”, he assured. In addition, he continued, the EU and Latin America have recently managed to close trade agreements (such as the one with Chile, at the end of 2023, or the one with Mercosur, at the end of 2024 and pending ratification in the European Parliament) “of the latest generation”, because “they are not only trade agreements” but they try to “create a common institutional language”. Under these conditions, according to Ernesto Talvi, Spain could play, in terms of the rapprochement between the two regions, “a role as fundamental as the one it played in the negotiation process of the EU-Mercosur agreement” to ensure that the EU-CELAC Summits have a “much more ambitious comprehensive agenda”. This agenda should include, he continued, “more pragmatic decisions” that allow “the harmonisation” of the existing bi-regional agreements, in order to create “a comprehensive economic space of 1.1 billion people and with a GDP similar to that of the United States”. With this scenario, he said, “bi-regional trade would increase by 70 percent and intra-regional trade by 40 percent in Latin America and the EU would become (except in the case of Mexico, very close to the US) a commercial partner of a similar magnitude to the US and China,” he said. In this same context, Talvi warned of the need to “revitalize” the Ibero-American Summits, taking advantage of the fact that Spain currently holds the Pro Tempore Secretariat and will host the XXX Ibero-American Summit in 2026, after the growing loss of relevance of this forum, as could be seen in the last meeting in Cuenca (Ecuador) in which the majority of Latin American leaders did not participate. In the opinion of the former Uruguayan minister, the Summits should be “more focused” not so much on historical and cultural ties and common heritage as “on what matters to us, such as the fight against transnational organized crime and immigration.” In this regard, the report warns that the relationship between Spain and Latin America should be seen as “a two-way process, improving dialogue with all Latin American countries, both from a regional and bilateral perspective,” and that Spain should redouble its efforts in 2025 “to strengthen the Euro-Latin American relationship, increasing coordination with the new European Commission.” <h5><strong>Europe</strong></h5> Precisely, the current institutional change in the EU is another of the major themes of the report, which shows that “the European agenda of the legislature that begins inherits a multitude of internal issues and challenges, such as the debate on reform and enlargement, and external ones, such as the war in Ukraine or the conflict in the Middle East.” In this scenario, also marked by the start of negotiations for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2028-2034 or “relevant factors” such as the health of the Franco-German axis, the effect of Donald Trump's return to the White House on transatlantic relations and the intensification of the commercial and technological confrontation with the US, Spain “has the opportunity to consolidate its leadership based on its seniority in the European Council” - the President of the Government, Pedro Sánchez, is the fourth “most experienced leader of the institution”, after the departure of the Dutch Mark Rutte and the Romanian Klaus Johannis - and “its weight as one of the most important Member States in the two main European political families”. “The main obstacle facing Spain is the acceleration of the politicisation of European affairs, preventing the agreement of a European State policy and transferring the domestic confrontation to the European institutions,” adds the document, which highlights that, in 2024, Spain “managed to have its designated commissioner appointed first vice-president with an important economic portfolio” and both the PP and PSOE “established themselves as influential parties in the European Parliament, although part of this potential is wasted due to the effect of polarisation”. <h5><strong>The report</strong></h5> In general terms, the report (coordinated by the principal investigators Ignacio Molina and Pablo del Amo) shows that, in 2024, Spanish foreign policy was again marked by its position in the wars in Ukraine, with whom it signed a security agreement, and Palestine, which was recognised as a State. “Spanish influence led to important achievements in multilateral organisations, presence in the Middle East and a very relevant portfolio for the Spanish commissioner,” highlights the study. “On the negative side, internal divisions between the government and the opposition stood out, as well as turbulence or little progress in some key bilateral relations,” it continues. At a global level, it adds, “Spain maintained a solid image, occupying prominent positions in international indices of prestige and soft power.” Looking ahead to 2025, according to the authors of the report, the main foreign policy challenge will be to manage the impact of Donald Trump’s return to the White House. “The new US administration may change the approach towards Russia, compromising the security of Europe,” the study warns. In addition, it continues, “depending on Trump’s approach” “towards Latin America and the Middle East, Spain may be subjected to strong pressures or, alternatively, play a leading role.” At a doctrinal level, in 2025 the elaboration of a new Foreign Action Strategy is expected, “adapted to the complex geopolitical environment,” while, in parallel, “the stability of Spain’s international image will continue to be an asset for its diplomatic relations,” it adds.
