SUMMARY
Defense, trade and energy are likely to be the three areas in which relations between the European Union and the United States will be most subject to tensions during Donald Trump’s new term in the White House. Support for Ukraine, increased tariffs or disagreements over measures to be taken to curb climate change will mark at least the next five years of transatlantic relations.
Enrique Viguera
Given the precedent of Trump’s previous presidency and his presidential campaign messages, it can be taken for granted that transatlantic relations will be strained. More serious would be that, in light of the apparent weakness of the French and German governments and Trump’s bilateral preference, the very process of European integration, which has been losing momentum in recent times, will also be jeopardized.
I will focus on three fields in which the situation appears complicated for Europe: military, trade and energy. It is in the military field and particularly in Ukraine that the first major bilateral rift between Europe and the United States may arise, which may create a risk of fragmentation in NATO itself. Statements that he would settle the conflict within 24 hours compel Trump to engage in a solution to the conflict or at least a ceasefire or armistice. While waiting for Trump to accede to power in January, it appears that both contenders, Russia and Ukraine, are preparing for negotiations by trying to gain ground on the battlefield. Hence the recent upsurge in fighting.
The Europeans would have liked to see Mike Pompeo as Secretary of State again. In his plan on Ukraine, the former Secretary of State and head of the CIA during Trump’s first term proposed as weapons of pressure against Russia massive financial aid to Ukraine, and to accelerate its candidacy for NATO. But it is not going to be so because Trump has discarded him from his list of collaborators and has proposed for that position Marco Rubio, who voted against the aid to Ukraine earlier this year.
Thus, the more pro-Russian vision of the future Vice-President JD Vance, who suggests freezing the conflict in its present state -Russia occupies 18% of the territory, with some 4 million inhabitants-, and that Ukraine should withdraw its candidacy to NATO and become neutral, without granting any further guarantees, seems to be gaining more strength. This temptation to reduce or eliminate US military aid and allow territorial concessions to the aggressor, which neither NATO nor the Ukrainian government have shown themselves willing to consider, would be an unbearable pressure for Zelenski -the Europeans are hardly in a position to totally replace US military aid to Ukraine- and would bring about a radical change in the new circumstances, with an undoubted triumph for Putin, subjecting Europe to strong geostrategic pressure. Therefore, lately a more intermediate path seems to impose itself, advocated by retired General Keith Kellogg, former National Security Advisor to Vice President Pence and Chief of Staff of the National Security Council in the previous Trump Administration, who will be the next special envoy for Ukraine (jointly with the also former Chief of Staff of the National Security Council Fred Fleitz), by insisting on playing with Ukraine’s rearmament or the increase of its military supplies, as well as with its candidacy to NATO as instruments of pressure against both contenders to force them to the negotiating table.
In defense, it is clear that, regardless of what happens in Ukraine, a significant increase in military spending is expected in each European state, although more urgently in the countries closest to Russia. An increase in the EU budget for these items is also expected in the EU, in addition to the expected reduction in the redundancy of expenditures, and the expansion of the European military industry. The debate on the extension of the French nuclear umbrella to the EU will gain further momentum as, incidentally a tightening of the EU’s military relations with the UK. Germany’s role in all this, even though it is in the midst of a serious political crisis, will again be critical.
On the trade front, it seems that the Commission has been considering different options to prevent a first hostile move by Washington in the form of a tariff increase. The Council of Foreign Ministers has also put the issue on its agenda as early as November. In view of the state of the European automotive industry in general and the German automotive industry in particular (again, Germany, the country with the largest trade surplus with the USA, which is the world’s largest importer of German vehicles), the problem could be quite serious. In the trade sector, moreover, it is raining on wet ground, given that the open trade conflicts between the EU and the US have not only not been solved during Biden’s presidency, but have actually worsened, such as the American tariffs on European steel and aluminum, the subsidies for electric cars in the US, the possible European countermeasures pending in different trade files, the Boeing/Airbus conflict, etc.). Trump will intensify protectionism, forcing Europeans to further increase their direct investments in the US in order not to lose positions in that market.
In the field of competition, another gap could emerge if Trump supports the giant technology companies in the face of what he may consider excessive pressures from the European regulatory system (fines on Apple and Meta, investigation on Google or X etc.). It remains to be seen what his attitude will be towards the proceedings opened in the US against some of these companies (Google, for example), but we should not lose sight of JD Vance’s close contact with Silicon Valley and the backing of figures such as Musk, Thiel, Andriesen and others, who could influence the next administration. The main instance of transatlantic cooperation in this field, the Trade and Technology Council created in 2021, will have a lot of work to do.
In the energy sector, the new administration’s lack of commitment to global climate targets could drag out the energy transition. This would force the EU to take greater leadership, increasing investments in third countries. However, in bilateral terms, energy relations might not deteriorate, given the growing gas production in the US and the increase in European imports, with Spain as the third largest importer. On the other hand, a possible reform or abolition of the IRA could benefit the European renewable industry and contribute to resolving trade disputes.
In short, the Commission’s contingency plans will be key in trying to minimize costs in the face of the next US administration – for which Europe is no longer the geostrategic priority. Unfortunately, Europe is ill-prepared to face such a radical change in the U.S. It is time to act to protect the European integration process. The EU needs to advance in its strategic autonomy, both in defense and in trade and energy, by equipping itself with concrete strategies to strengthen its global position.
ENRIQUE VIGUERA
Ambassador of Spain
Born on April 6, 1953, Enrique Viguera holds a degree in Law from the University of Seville and entered the Diplomatic Career in 1982. He was stationed in Ethiopia and Canada and was Deputy Director General for Sub-Saharan Africa, but much of his career has been spent in positions related to the European Union. Thus, he was posted as a counselor at the Permanent Representation of Spain in Brussels, was Deputy Director General of General Affairs for the EU and, subsequently, between 2004 and 2006 Director General of Coordination of General and Technical Affairs of the EU and Director General of Integration and Coordination of General and Economic Affairs of the EU.
He has also been ambassador of Spain to Sweden (2006-2010), to Australia (2011-2015) and to Greece (2017-2021), as well as ambassador-at-large for Energy Affairs. Between 2015 and 2017 he was director of the Diplomatic School and, in February 2023 he was promoted to the professional category of ambassador.
