<h6><strong>Luis Ayllón</strong></h6> <h4><strong>To mark the tenth anniversary of The Diplomat in Spain, we have interviewed the people who held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs in that decade, addressing their management at that time. We begin our series with José Manuel García-Margallo, who was at the head of Spanish diplomacy in the first government of Mariano Rajoy (PP).</strong></h4> <em><strong>José Manuel García-Margallo (Madrid, 1944). </strong><strong>He was Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, between December 2011 and November 2016. He studied Law and Economics at the University of Deusto and received his doctorate in Law from the Miguel Hernández University, in Murcia. He was a member of the Spanish Parliament in three legislatures, with UCD, Coalición Popular and the Partido Popular. Between 1994 and 2011 he was a member of the European Parliament for the PP, holding the positions of vice-president of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and of the Delegation for Central America and Mexico, as well as president of the Delegation for Relations with the countries of the Andean Community. After ceasing to be Minister of Foreign Affairs, he was re-elected as a member of the European Parliament in 2019. He remained in the European Parliament until the end of the legislature, in 2024, and in June of this year he announced his retirement from politics. He is the author of numerous publications and books, the last of which was published in March of this year under the title “Spain, terra incognita. The siege of democracy”.</strong></em> <strong>-In 2014, when The Diplomat began its journey, you had already been at the head of the Ministry for a couple of years and some events were taking place that have since had a continuity, such as the invasion of Crimea by Russia. Did Spain then fear what we have experienced afterwards?</strong> - Ukrainian President Viktor Janukovic wanted an Association Treaty between the EU and his country. At the same time, Vladimir Putin was launching the Eurasian Union and threatened Janukovic with a veto as a third country if he opted for an Association Treaty with the EU. Janukovic withdrew his application and when he returned to Ukraine he was confronted with the Maidan movement, which Russia considered to be an artificial creation of the West. The Rada dismissed Janukovic and Russia invaded Crimea and activated separatist movements in Donbas. There was no reaction in the West and that is what explains why Putin decided to invade Ukraine again. Russian foreign policy has always consisted of keeping its adversaries away from its nerve centres, Moscow and St. Petersburg. If in Gorbachev's time Russia even thought about joining NATO, now Russia's other soul triumphs, which is to look towards the East and become an adversary. That explains what happened. The end of all this? I believe there will be no peace treaty, because Putin cannot return to Moscow having abandoned all the territory he has conquered, mainly the Donbas and Crimea. And Zelensky cannot accept a peace agreement for territory. Most likely we will see a ceasefire and a withdrawal of troops to a safe distance, an exchange of prisoners and a coexistence like that of the two Koreas or what is happening in Cyprus. <strong>-You also went to Cuba that year, on a trip that ended without the then Cuban president, Raúl Castro, receiving you. Did that trip serve any purpose? Do you think Cuba has made any progress towards democracy since then?</strong> -The American Secretary of State at the time of Obama warned me that they were going to change their position, because they considered that the embargo regime and the prohibition of remittances and travel had not served any purpose. And that they were going to soften their position. I told them that, if this was the case, Spain ran the risk of being isolated in the EU Foreign Affairs Council. It was decided that we were going to do it and also that I was going to make a trip. I asked to see the dissidents and was refused. It was decided that I would give a lecture at a kind of Diplomatic Academy, in which I would explain how the transition was. As I was going to talk about the advantages of a liberal democracy over a communist dictatorship, they did not like it at all and told me that the press was not allowed in. I told the ambassador that if there was no press, I would leave. In the end, they gave in. The conference was received with a deathly silence. And they cancelled the meeting planned with Raúl Castro. When time passed, I returned to Cuba and was received by Díaz Canel. Why is there such a change of attitude? Not only because the Americans announced that they were going to change their position, but also because, on my first trip to Cuba, when I was president of the European delegation for Central America and Cuba, I met with Cardinal Ortega of Havana. His thesis was that the solution should be a Spanish-style solution, with negotiations between the opposition and the regime and that the Castroites should be given the opportunity to become a party that competed on equal terms. He told me that if they continued to say from Miami that they were going to be shot and thrown into the sea, it would not go well. That advised me to have a different relationship than the one we had. <strong>-Also during your mandate, the relationship with the Bolivarian regime in Venezuela was anything but calm, both with Chávez and later with Nicolás Maduro, with insults included to the then president of the Government, Mariano Rajoy…</strong> -We are in the same situation as then. At that time there were a number of Spanish companies in Venezuela and that required a certain restraint. There were elections that the opposition contested. I suggested the possibility of mediating, which was not welcomed by the regime. Spain's great interest was to maintain the Ibero-American General Secretariat and the Ibero-American Summits. And there could have been more reprisals against Spanish companies. But relations were never broken. <strong>-A great change in foreign policy has been the relationship with Morocco and the Sahara. How do you remember Spain's relations with Morocco, then? I think I remember that they were not excessively difficult...</strong> -On the contrary, they were extraordinarily easy. That is to say, both with Algeria and with Morocco we were going to be the first clients and the first suppliers. With Algeria we have a privileged relationship that would have allowed us, using the two gas pipelines and the seven regasification plants, to have replaced the 40% that came from Russia, whose shipments were suspended after Ukraine. And with Morocco we had good relations, they helped me enormously in the control of immigration at source. And the position on the Sahara was negotiated simultaneously with both, defending the recognition of the free determination of the Saharawi people, always within the principles of the United Nations. And it never created the slightest difficulty for us. I do not remember having had a single problem with either Algeria or Morocco. Relations in terms of immigration and economic relations were extraordinarily favourable. There were three or four visits by the King and Queen there and when we went the King did not always receive us. <strong>-Do you understand the current position of the Spanish Government?</strong> -Neither I nor anyone else understand it. Either there are hidden interests that I do not understand or there is a position of weakness. The policy they have made in the Maghreb is to be studied in the Diplomatic School. The leader of the Polisario Front was welcomed and that led to the withdrawal of the Moroccan ambassador. Then, the Gendarmerie allowed a massive entry into Ceuta that terrified the Government. Then, the Government decided to change sides. There is another explanation, which is that the Government wanted to make a gesture of complacency towards the US, because the Abraham Accords were being negotiated. But that, of course, is contradictory to the things that the president has done later in relation to Israel. <strong>-After the parliamentary agreement in 2014 in favour of recognising Palestine as a state, were the conditions in place at any time during your mandate for this to happen?</strong> -The last visit I made to Israel was extremely violent, because there was an Israeli ambassador in Spain who made very unfortunate statements about Catalonia and there was one of his consuls who also made them. Then, on a trip I made to Israel, we threatened to announce that we were going to open a consulate in Gaza. In the interview with Netanyahu, in his office, he told me that he wanted to talk about the problem of the Consulate and the problem of Catalonia. I explained to him that he had one problem, which was Palestine, and I had another, which was Catalonia. And I told him that, if things continued like this, I would recognise Palestine on the way out. And then that calmed down and there was nothing. The prime minister who says that the solution for there to be a Palestinian state is the only one and who votes for Palestine to be an observer in the United Nations is me. And I went to the Congress of Deputies in 2014 and said it. The bill, naturally, would not have been passed if I had said no. And it was passed. The two-state solution is the only possible one. But now, with which Palestine are we going to negotiate? Not with Hamas, as long as it does not renounce violence. And negotiating with a Palestinian Authority that has not held elections since 2005-2006 is useless. As I said in 2014, for it to be effective it had to be a joint decision of all the states of the European Union, not this internal division. And of course with an agreement in the US, if we really want to reach a solution. <strong>-You spent a lot of time talking abroad about the problem of Catalonia…</strong> -Every Friday we had meetings at Foreign Affairs on the subject of Catalonia and an argument was made that was periodically distributed to all our delegations abroad. We spent our lives convincing Belgium and France that the ETA members were terrorists, explaining that unilateral secession was contrary to the constitution. And now they are having to say exactly the opposite of what we were saying. I made countless trips to deactivate what was then called the Baltic route, as an example. The truth is that there was not a single country - not even Venezuela - that recognised or showed sympathy for the process at that time. <strong>-Another issue that took up quite a bit of time was Gibraltar</strong> -Moratinos had established a tripartite agreement in which Gibraltar sat on equal terms with the United Kingdom and Spain. And I told them no, that if they wanted Gibraltar to be at a meeting, the Junta de Andalucía would have to be there too, with equal delegations and knowing who represents whom. And when Brexit happens, that's when God comes to see me. Because Gibraltar had access to community legislation because a member state carried out its foreign relations. That was the United Kingdom. When the United Kingdom leaves and is left hanging, then Spain could be that Member State. And we managed to ensure that any negotiation between the United Kingdom and the European Union on Gibraltar required the prior approval of Spain. It had the key. So, the solution that we proposed, that we took to the United Nations, that we took to Europe, that we took to the Ibero-American summit in Cartagena, called for co-sovereignty for a period to be fixed, which allowed Gibraltar access to the internal market, since Spain was already removing the Fence, in terms of immigration and defence. In terms of defence, that would have allowed a large base in the Mediterranean, Gibraltar, without the problems that arise from conflicts over waters or airspace that are not ceded by Utrecht, which would have placed us in a first-class strategic position. <strong>-And in terms of taxes?</strong> -We proposed the independent administration of all other matters, which is provided for in the Constitution, article 144, when it speaks of territories not integrated into the provincial organisation; and dual nationality. And then the problem of definitively resolving the development of Campo de Gibraltar. Today the difference in income between Campo de Gibraltar and Gibraltar is six times, the largest in the world. Gibraltar, which has 32,000 inhabitants, has no natural resources and is the third perfect capita income in the world. Why? Because it has tax advantages that distort competition. It has no special taxes on tobacco, alcohol and oil. The income tax does not tax the profits of companies obtained outside the Rock. All of that, with the tax agreement signed by this government, the first agreement signed after Utrecht, is a tax agreement that allows them to maintain all those advantages. If that is so, who is going to invest in Campo de Gibraltar if they can invest in Gibraltar? That is why I am talking about the second surrender. And this is going to turn into a Monaco. You tell a Monegasque that if he wants to be French, he says: but are you stupid? Yes, I have all the advantages of the French. Gibraltarians want to be Spanish in everything, except when it comes to paying taxes. All of this makes me extremely upset and extremely frustrated. <strong>-But it was Mariano Rajoy's own government that did not go ahead...</strong> -Yes, yes, yes, of course. I said that I would never accept that. When it was suggested to me that sovereignty had to be renounced, I said no way. I would not have liked to go down in history as the foreign minister who accepts that, having all the cards in hand, he does not claim sovereignty. <strong>-To go on to more general issues. In the European Union, since then, since 2014, what changes have you seen in Spain's position?</strong> -There are things that are measurable and therefore not debatable. Spain was in 12th place, economically. We have already lost three positions, overtaken by Malta, Cyprus, the Czech Republic and now Estonia. When you are losing economic weight, you also lose political weight. And when you do not have a defined position on any of the major issues, then nobody takes you seriously. <strong>-In the field of the Ministry, what are you most proud of?</strong> -I had a very good time as a minister. When we arrived, there was no legislative framework, although it had been attempted four times. I wanted to make a Law on the Foreign Service. President Rajoy told me that he was not going to bring it out, that it was getting me into trouble. I said that it had to be brought out, because I also knew that Catalonia was going to do something similar before, and we had to have a legislative framework in which we could absorb that. And the Law on Foreign Action, the Law on Treaties, the Law on Immunities and the Regulations on the Diplomatic Career were made, which fell through because of a story with a union, but it had to be done, which gave a legislative framework that had never been there before. We had provisions that came from 1955. Secondly, I said that a country that values itself must have a global and well-known strategy, which was the foreign action plan. The foreign action strategy is exactly that. Thirdly, we had to reestablish relations with the United States, which were extraordinarily deteriorated. The first important interview I had was with Hillary Clinton in Munich in February, and she had taken office in December. And at that time, Hillary Clinton said that, with Zapatero's foreign policy, the withdrawal of troops from Iraq without warning, the invitations she made in Tunisia to everyone to do the same, etc., had led them to think about taking Rota and Moron to Morocco, which would have meant a qualitative change in the Straits. With the United States, we got on really well. That explains what we were talking about regarding the policy with Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia, etc. We carried out all those policies very closely and in a very concerted manner. What's more, I will say that the change of the United States towards Cuba was possible because Spain wanted it. Because once the Americans explained to me that they were going to change, one day John Kerry called me and told me that we were the problem. I asked him why and he explained that to make that change he needed to remove Cuba from the list of countries that supported terrorism. For us there was a problem because in Cuba there were ETA prisoners that Felipe González had sent, that the National Court had claimed them and that the Cuban Government had not answered. I called the Cuban foreign minister to tell him to answer the Court, because if not, it would not be possible to continue with the United States plan. And it got unstuck. With Latin America, we managed to change the summits, which were dying, and we tried a policy in Asia. With Africa we had a balanced relationship with all the countries that was very satisfactory. I have never been rejected, and I don't remember having had any major difficulties in Congress. <strong>-What do you think is missing from Spanish foreign policy at the moment?</strong> -The most important thing in politics, but above all in foreign policy, is what De Gaulle said, which is to have a very clear idea of what your country is, what Spain is. You can't be doing these things that we are doing abroad, like changing the misappropriation that the Europeans tell us is not even half a joke about playing with their money. The first thing is to know what your position is in the world, to know what your external projection is. And knowing your external projection is to be very clear about the world you want to belong to. And Spain by definition has to be in liberal democracies. And what they certainly have to do is to value the diplomatic corps. It is inconceivable that there are four vice presidents and not one vice president for foreign action, which is where diplomacy, foreign action, and defense are.
