The Hamas-Israel conflict necessarily leads to other actors in the Middle East region, such as Qatar and Iran. In the analysis of the capabilities of each of the parties involved lies the essence of deterrence.
Gabriel Cortina
Strategic Security Affairs Analyst
The Hamas-Israel conflict necessarily leads to other actors in the Middle East region, such as Qatar and Iran. In the analysis of the capabilities of each of the parties involved lies the essence of deterrence.
Diplomacy must take into account this reality, which is a dimension of military power. I would like to offer an assessment of what is not seen on Iran’s side: its submarine weapon. It currently has 20 units, three of which are attack (Kilo Class), and are distributed between the Caspian Sea, the Gulf of Oman, the Persian and the Indian Ocean.
Geography shapes strategic reality and a detailed analysis of maps, both land and naval, is necessary. The Islamic republic has sovereignty over one of the world’s most important naval routes, whose territorial waters it shares with Oman. Twenty per cent of the world’s oil passes through these waters, so Iran’s submarines are located under this international trade. To reduce the risk of collision of tankers and LNG tankers, inbound tankers use one lane and outbound tankers use another, so it is much easier to monitor from the periscope. A war against Iran affects the global balance of this necessary raw material, hence, a priori, it is necessary to respect this red line.
The same is true when considering a possible air strike by Israel, because of the distances involved, the logistical capacity for air-to-air supply and the mountainous geography, not to mention the characteristics of the anti-aircraft defences. The same is true for Iran in its attack on Israel, which is why it is preferable to launch drones and cruise missiles rather than fighter jets, the cost and maintenance of which are incomparable. The best is best left to last. What is at stake is electromagnetic superiority, and it affects all sides. Also in the naval field, through radar and sonar.
The Iranian navy organises exercises on a regular basis, which implies a desire for continuous improvement. Alongside the visible fleet, there is the unseen fleet, which is for civilian use (fishing, recreational) for military purposes (espionage). Despite import contracts with China and Russia, Iran has been able to build and maintain its submarines since 2005. It is interesting to know what kind of torpedoes and cruise missiles it has. The advantage is that with a range of just 20 kilometres it can keep the game board in check. Its challenge is to get nuclear reactors to integrate them and move into the next league, that of nuclear-capable submarines. If it can, it will. Another unseen issue is remotely manned underwater platforms (Unmanned Undersea Vehicle), which enable it to tackle numerous operations and multiply its deterrence. The Iranian equation of underwater weapons, oil-gas trade and the Strait of Hormuz explains one of its strengths, which implies rethinking the offensive actions of its adversaries.
