SUMMARY
It is safe to say that Ukraine, once it becomes a member state, will soon become, depending on how the transitional periods are negotiated, probably the main recipient of EU funds. If the ‘frugals’ continue in their stance of not increasing the EU budget, what would happen would be a huge transfer of funds, a tremendous rebalancing of the budget, particularly at the expense of the current beneficiaries – among them Spain – to the benefit of Ukraine.
Enrique Viguera
Hungary’s presidency of the EU Council has just been inaugurated. As one of the most nationalistic countries in the EU, with a populist and Eurosceptic leader who has vetoed as many decisions as possible regarding Russia, and who is now on a high after the recent elections to the European Parliament, I don’t think anything extraordinary should be expected from the current six months in terms of European integration.
Moreover, as this is a stage that is opening just after the inauguration of the new institutions, the Commission and the European Parliament, and the beginning of the new legislative cycle, these next six months should be used for reflection, for drawing up programmes, for team-building, on what should be done after 2025, with the Polish and then Danish Presidencies. It could also serve as a waiting room for the presidential elections in the United States. An eventual Trump victory would be welcomed by Orban, but the EU will have to prepare to live with him for the next few years, trying to avoid any erosion of transatlantic relations. This would be no easy task.
One of the issues already open is Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations which, following the decision to begin negotiations under the Spanish presidency, will now enter the more bureaucratic phase of analysing the situation of the different chapters and assessing the need for reforms. This is not a normal negotiation, starting with the fact that it has never been negotiated with a country at war that has a portion of its territory militarily occupied. But we should not lose sight of the fact that it is exceptional not only because of the special geopolitical situation it is going through and which affects all Europeans, but also because of its own national circumstances. In terms of level of development, standard of living and political situation, it is perhaps the most difficult accession negotiation the EU has ever faced in its history. As a result, accession negotiations with Ukraine will be very long. Perhaps longer than the Balkan countries have been negotiating, which are already breaking time records.
Although the political reasons are obvious, in light of Russia’s unjustifiable aggression, I have not yet seen the consequences of this accession for Spain debated or studied in detail in our country. Perhaps because it is still a long way off. Moreover, if it was precisely during the Spanish presidency of the Council that the formal opening of negotiations was proposed, it is not politically correct to stop and analyse the consequences for Spain. Although, as the recent opinion poll of the European Council on Foreign Relations conducted in 15 countries shows, public opinion in some member states, the fewest of them, is mostly of the opinion that accession is a bad idea, among them Germany and France, Spanish public opinion, which has always been in favour of enlargement, is also in favour of it in this case.
But at first glance, if Ukraine were to join, it does not seem difficult to predict that this accession would have the most negative effects for Spain of all those that have taken place to date. Economically and financially, Ukraine would require massive investments for reconstruction and economic development. With its current population and low standard of living, it would soon become the largest recipient of cohesion funds – the second largest expenditure item in the EU budget – more than Poland, currently the largest recipient of these funds – Spain is the second largest.
Huge investments would also be required in agriculture – the EU’s top spending item. Ukraine is Europe’s largest country after Russia, and its agro-industrial complex accounts for 10 per cent of its GDP and 40 per cent of its exports. It is estimated that its agriculture alone would be able to feed a population of between 600 and 1 billion people, potentially the entire EU. Its adaptation to the EU, or rather the adaptation of EU agriculture to Ukraine, would take time and have consequences that are not easy to assess at this stage, but the investments would be extremely large.
So it is safe to say that Ukraine, once it joins as a member state, would, depending on how the transitional periods are negotiated, very soon become the main recipient of EU funds. If the ‘frugals’ continue to stick to their guns of not increasing the EU budget, what would ensue would be a huge transfer of funds, a tremendous rebalancing of the budget, particularly at the expense of the current beneficiaries – including Spain – to the benefit of Ukraine.
Obviously, the internal market would expand, as would trade and investment possibilities. But those member states that are closer or have closer relations with Ukraine – which is not the case of Spain at the moment – would gain comparatively more, and those that are further away would have fewer possibilities.
These would not be the only problems for the EU and Spain. Its entry would be a real boost in the weighting of votes in the Council among the different member states, given its large number of inhabitants, more than Poland and slightly less than Spain. The political balance in the EU would shift definitively to the East, to the detriment of the West. Spain’s relative position in the context of the EU, already damaged after the last accession, would worsen even further, whatever solution is reached.
But Spain cannot oppose enlargement. It is a European political imperative and, in the case of Ukraine, an unavoidable show of solidarity, especially in view of Russian aggression. On a conjunctural level, therefore, it should be supported.
But structurally, things can change. If these new circumstances improve, Spain cannot fail to take into account all the issues mentioned above and fight for a much more ambitious EU budget than the current one, in which the inevitable loss of funds can somehow be compensated for. If necessary, it would even be more than justified to advocate launching a specific reconstruction programme, similar to the ‘Next Generation EU’, so as not to affect the current budget balance too much. At the political level, Spain should be demanding in order to avoid situations such as those recently experienced with Poland or Hungary and try, as far as possible, not to lose too much power in the new weighting of votes, which will be inevitable.
In this situation, and if the Balkan countries have already joined, we should consider whether, given the prospect of enlargement, it would not be in our interest to encourage the simultaneous accession of a democratic Turkey. You will tell me that in that case the problems mentioned above would multiply. That is true. Quite a lot, moreover. But if the case arises, and if the aim is to reunite the great European family, would it not be worth taking advantage of the circumstances to try to get everyone in once and for all?
Enrique Viguera
Ambassador of Spain
Born on 6 April 1953, Enrique Viguera holds a law degree from the University of Seville and entered the diplomatic service in 1982. He was posted to Ethiopia and Canada and was Deputy Director General for Sub-Saharan Africa, but much of his career has been spent in posts related to the European Union. He was posted as Counsellor in the Permanent Representation of Spain in Brussels, was Deputy Director General of General Affairs for the EU and, later, between 2004 and 2006, Director General of Coordination of General and Technical Affairs of the EU and Director General of Integration and Coordination of General and Economic Affairs of the EU.
He has also been Spanish Ambassador to Sweden (2006-2010), to Australia (2011-2015) and to Greece (2017-2021), as well as Ambassador-at-Large for Energy Affairs. Between 2015 and 2017 he was Director of the Diplomatic School and, in February 2023, he was promoted to the professional category of Ambassador.
