Frédéric Mertens de Wilmars
Coordinator of the Degree in International Relations at the European University of Valencia
North Korea fired at least two ballistic missiles from its west coast on Friday, 14 January, the third launch in less than two weeks, after warning of a strong response to recent US sanctions against the Pyongyang regime. While some see these manoeuvres as part of the North Korean military’s winter exercises, in reality they should be seen as a message to the United States.
The US military’s Indo-Pacific Command says that while it did not believe the launch posed an immediate threat to the United States or its allies, it highlighted the destabilising impact of North Korea’s illicit weapons programme. For its part, North Korea defends its missile launches as a legitimate right of self-defence, while claiming that the US is intentionally aggravating the situation by imposing new sanctions against it.
Beyond a show of force against President Joe Biden and his allies – first and foremost South Korea – these three missile launches appear to be a means of diverting the North Korean population’s attention from growing domestic difficulties and, in particular, food shortages.
However, the example of the demonstrations in the streets of Kazakhstan against the excessive increase in the price of energy resources shows that any regime, however harsh and totalitarian it may be, does not stand up well to the wrath of a hungry or cold people. In this regard, during his speech on 1 January, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un chose to emphasise the importance of fighting food shortages while continuing to bolster his defence. In addition, the pressure on its ailing economy has been increased by the strict border closures ordered to combat the coronavirus pandemic.
The first of the three missile launches preceded within hours the inauguration by South Korean President Moon Jae-in of the construction of a railway in eastern South Korea, the first step in establishing a rail link between the two Koreas, with the aim of connecting to the Trans-Siberian Railway. The project was one of the commitments made at the end of the groundbreaking 2018 meeting between Moon and the North’s leader Kim Jong-un to revive inter-Korean dialogue. Strengthening inter-Korean relations remains a priority for the South Korean leader as he nears the end of his term in May. Despite the 2018-2019 interlude, punctuated by several meetings with Kim Jong-Un, efforts have not led to real progress. His desire to officially declare an end to the Korean War (1950-1953) – interrupted by a simple armistice – has clashed with the intransigence of Pyongyang, which claimed to agree in principle but demanded an end to the US “hostile policy”.
For its part, Washington condemned the missile launch, while reiterating its “commitment to a diplomatic approach” towards North Korea, which it called for “dialogue”. A discourse that is repeated at every missile launch – seven launches in 2021 – by a US administration that seems to have other priorities. US-North Korean talks have been stalled since the failure of the 2019 Hanoi summit between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump.
Finally, the North Korean regime, with some rationality, does not consider itself in a weak position vis-à-vis the White House. First, Kim Jong-un believes that he could achieve no greater gains through negotiation than he will once he has a functioning nuclear deterrent. Second, his regime has gambled that its ballistic tests alone will not be able to trigger a US intervention. However, it is not clear that Pyongyang is adequately managing the risk of accidental escalation. The hypothesis of a US strike in response to a missile launch cannot be entirely excluded, as Joe Biden must provide assurances to his Asian allies. This scenario would have serious consequences, especially in a tense context between the US administration and China, North Korea’s main supporter.
Ultimately, the Americans’ behaviour raises doubts about their ability to propose a readable roadmap for the Korean peninsula. Organising a negotiation that sets both the technical parameters of an agreement on North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic programmes and the first steps towards a return to regional stability (a condition for the “freezing of the dangerous situation” to lead to a long-term solution) seems at this stage unattainable. Not only is the US administration unable to orchestrate Biden’s strategy (if it has one like his predecessor), but US geopolitical weakness accentuates its regional allies’ loss of confidence in extended deterrence. Under these conditions, there is a real risk that North Korean launches will generate a regional nuclear proliferation dynamic.
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