Alberto Suárez Sutil
Master’s Degree in Security and Terrorism
The fall of Afghanistan this summer at the hands of the Taliban, in addition to being the first major defeat in the Global War on Terrorism, revived the controversial debate in the European Union about equipping the EU with its own security and defence capabilities.
At first glance, the events of August underpin the need for the EU to equip itself with an armed wing: the United States – once Europe’s great protector – is turning towards China, its great rival, and is asking Europe to defend itself on its own because, if it is capable of being an economic power, it can also be a military one. There is no shortage of scenarios for this, such as the Sahel. In this area, where the terrorist threat has increased, a strong EU response is needed to show that it is capable of ensuring its own security, otherwise the terrorist threat will reach Europe. Moreover, in this scenario, the EU has the advantage of being the actor with the political, economic, and potentially military muscle to do so, something that, if the longed-for European army were to be created, would most likely demonstrate to the world that the European Union is capable of managing its own security and by extension that of the world1.
To achieve this, we need to consider whether there is consensus within the Union on the creation of a European army and the structures that would facilitate and coordinate such an entity. Two requirements are that there should be a community consensus to this end (in the countries as well as in the Union’s decision-making bodies) and that there should be unanimity in the media on the usefulness of a European army.
With respect to Community consensus, the messages from both EU representatives and EU-27 ministers are contradictory. While the EU as a whole seems to realise that Brussels needs an independent military reaction capability, there is no consensus on how such a deployment would be decided and how troops would be provided. An example of this dilemma is the words of German Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer who: ‘proposed to explore the possibility of an eventual deployment being decided by the EU-27, while troops would only be provided through a coalition of the willing2‘.
Voluntary troop contributions are likely to create an inequality of contributions that is likely to cause resentment in European capitals between those countries that contribute more troops on the ground and ready to fight and those whose troops do not engage in combat or are only used for logistical support. An example of this problem can be found in France’s unsuccessful attempts to Europeanise Barkhane. European support has been limited to transporting French troops and supplies, a laudable mission but one that does a disservice to demonstrating the Union’s ability to defend its security on its own. The same goes for Task Force Takuba, made up of European special forces, which France was betting on as a sign of the Europeanisation of the conflict: only eight European countries have contributed troops, and half of them are French3. It is very likely that French military commanders, already tired of the high cost in lives and the physical and psychological fatigue of Barkhane, will soon begin to call for a greater European presence on the ground, something that will surely be unwelcome in some European capitals, creating tensions that will most likely undermine the will to create a European army.
As for the EU-27 deciding on the deployment of troops, if we bear in mind that the Union lacks consensus on its foreign policy, that decisions taken in Brussels have to be endorsed by the legislative bodies of the member states and that there are divisions within the Union over who to defend against – against Russia, as the Baltic states and Poland are calling for, or against terrorism in the Sahel, as Spain and France want, it is unlikely that a consensus will be reached on how, where and when the hypothetical European army would be deployed. If there is no agreement on the EU’s foreign policy, especially on how to combine the Russian and Sahel terrorist threats under a single banner and whether to opt for qualified majority or unanimity of the 27 to decide on military deployment, it is highly unlikely that the dream of a European army will be achieved, once again highlighting the EU’s irrelevance in foreign policy.
On the unanimity of discourse on the need for a European army, we are once again faced with divergences that are very likely to undermine the possibility of Brussels having its own armed wing. The fact that some opinions on the subject are very vehement and controversially against it does not help to promote the need for a European army4. If we look beyond opinions and focus on interviews – especially of EU personalities linked to security and defence and EU foreign policy – we see that some of their statements are likely to weaken the case for an army. For example, interviews with Josep Borrell – the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Policy – and Nathalie Loiseau – chair of the European Parliament’s subcommittee on Security and Defence – in Spanish newspapers.
Loiseau calls for a stronger NATO, when it would be logical for him to call for the acceleration of the implementation of the European army given his position in the European Parliament. For his part, Borrell acknowledged that the Union would have been unable to manage the security of the evacuation of Kabul airport on its own. These two statements are indicative that there is still a long way to go to create a European army, but the time to do so is getting shorter and the scenarios where the EU operates, especially on the African continent, will most likely require Brussels to deploy troops jointly to evacuate its citizens should the situation deteriorate. Let us not forget that, earlier this year, the possibility of Afghanistan falling into Taliban hands was likely in the medium to long term. Bamako could be next.
In conclusion, the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban in August this year revived the debate in the European Union about the need for a home-grown army. The US turn towards Asia, the EU’s economic muscle and the scenarios in which EU missions operate, especially in the Sahel, offer Brussels a unique potential to demonstrate its ability to defend its interests militarily. However, such ambition would come up against the problems of uneven troop contributions and their use in combat and how to agree on who the enemy is and how military deployment is decided, with the example of Barkhane and political indecision symptomatic of these problems. Finally, the lack of a united media front on the need for Brussels to equip itself with an armed wing, especially coming from the likes of Josep Borrell, will not contribute to this end, reinforcing the image of the EU’s security and defence policy as one of much rhetoric but little substance.
© This article vas originally published in Atalayar / All rights reserved
