Carlos Malamud
Senior Analyst for Latin America at the Elcano Royal Institute
The primary, open, simultaneous and mandatory elections -PASO as they are colloquially known- do not serve to elect any office or authority, but only to select the candidates of the competing political forces that will participate in the following elections. Beyond their role of organizing the internal differences of the parties and coalitions, which are usually settled before the electoral lists are drawn up, the PASO works as a great test, on a 1:1 scale, which allows to effectively measure the political and social temperature of the Argentine society.
Since their implementation in 2009, they have always been an advanced indicator of what would happen a couple of months later. Hence their importance and hence the seriousness with which their results should be analyzed by political forces as well as by the media and public opinion in general. On this occasion, the results were clearly adverse to the interests of the ruling Peronism/Kirchnerism. Although the average of the known polls allowed to hope for a victory of the ruling party, although closer than what was speculated four or five months ago, the electoral disaster was of such magnitude that “earthquake” or “tsunami” were the most repeated words to describe it.
On this occasion, candidates were selected for the mid-term parliamentary elections, to be held next November 14, in which one third of the Senate and half of the Chamber of Representatives will be renewed. At present, the ruling party has its own majority in the Senate and is the first minority in the Chamber of Representatives. With these figures, the governability is not guaranteed, although it has a wide margin of maneuver. However, those norms that require qualified majorities are more difficult to pass, as they require complex negotiations with the opposition, which is not always possible.
After these results and in view of the possibility that they may be repeated (or aggravated) in November, an important question is to see the reaction of the different political actors and also of the main economic agents. Among the former, we must take into account what is happening within the ruling party and the main opposition coalition, although without losing sight of the left and the new liberals, as well as the provincial parties, which in certain constituencies (such as Neuquén) continue to have an important presence.
In the ruling party we have in the first place the confrontation between President Alberto Fernandez and Vice President Cristina Fernandez. The marriage of convenience woven more than two years ago, which allowed the recovery of the Casa Rosada, is not going through its best moment. What is more, what the failure of their management of the economic crisis and the mismanagement of the pandemic has demonstrated is the dysfunctionality of the dual command system put in place, and the inability of the Vice-President to accept a secondary role in the administration of the country.
If before the PASO the pressure of Kirchnerism to change the course of the government was already intense, after these results it is becoming even greater. The major trophies to be collected are the heads of Santiago Cafiero, the Chief of Cabinet, and of Martín Guzmán, the Minister of Economy and responsible for the negotiation with the IMF. According to the followers of Cristina Fernandez and her heir Máximo Kirchner, they are two of the main responsible, although not the only ones, for the wrong course taken by Alberto Fernandez and which, according to their particular perspective, is what has snatched the triumph from them.
Actually, the problem of the government’s mismanagement, which goes beyond the increase in inflation, the higher number of poor people, corruption, the scandals linked to the VIP vaccination and the failed strategies of production and acquisition of vaccines and, above all, the Olivosgate (the dissemination of photos celebrating the First Lady’s birthday in the middle of the worst of the first wave of the pandemic) is not only Alberto Fernandez’s responsibility, but also Cristina Fernandez’s. A good part of the policies implemented by the government are not only the responsibility of Alberto Fernandez, but also of Cristina Fernandez. A good part of the policies implemented, and of the people appointed to manage them, respond to the guidelines of the most hard-line Kirchnerism.
However, the problem goes beyond this and is affecting the unitary project that the Frente de Todos (Front of All) believed to be, where Kirchnerists and Peronists converged behind the invincible project of “Cristina Vice-president”. Peronism and, above all, its provincial and local leaders (governors and mayors) find the defeat very difficult to digest. Therefore, if the PASO results are repeated in November, the settling of scores will deepen and the “traditional justicialism” will start to distance itself from those responsible for the failure. And one of them, undoubtedly, is Cristina Fernández.
Moreover, if the coalition Juntos por el Cambio (Radicals and Macristas) advances in both the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate, the Vice-President will not only lose her main bastion of power (she is the President of the Senate), but the very governability of the country will be affected. And in that case, especially in the most controversial legislative projects, it will be necessary to negotiate, something difficult and complicated for those who, like Kirchnerism, are not prone to do so systematically. Simultaneously, the attempts of the ruling party to advance on justice will be compromised, not only to stop the trials against Cristina Kirchner, but also to reform the government of the judges, either through the composition of the Council of the Magistrature, or through the Supreme Court and the functioning of both institutions.
Juntos por el Cambio has done the hardest thing so far, but it has great challenges ahead. The first was to reverse the memory of Mauricio Macri’s administration and its very deteriorated image. The second was to maintain the unity of the different opposition forces and the contradictions that have arisen among some of its leaders. The reward is obvious, although it is not enough to win the PASO. They will have to repeat the move in November and, above all, aim at the jackpot, the presidency of the country, in October 2023.
From the markets’ perspective, the initial reaction was as expected. Relief in the face of the defeat of Kirchnerism, which translated into a rise in Argentine stocks on Wall Street, a drop in the dollar and in the country risk. These are all reactions thinking in the medium term, but the big question is what will happen in the coming weeks, especially with the government’s intention to reverse the result and win in November. It is most likely that the course already started will be maintained and that indebtedness, monetary emission and public expenditure will continue their upward path, complicating not only the macroeconomic balance, but also a probable and more than necessary agreement with the IMF.
The result of Sunday 12 is a clear expression of the “bronca vote”, or angry vote, against Latin American officialisms. This phenomenon, although it had been manifesting itself for some years, has gained renewed strength after the outbreak of the pandemic. Therefore, the three great challenges facing the November elections are: 1) will the “angry vote” be maintained, and how much; 2) will the useful vote work; what will the voters of the minor forces do and who will they support in November; and 3) given the low turnout, how will those who did not go to the polls this time vote? The outcome of a crucial election for the future of Argentina will depend on the combination of these factors.
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